How do you know that training produced a real effect?

Michał Rutkowski • for senior management and data protection officers • published August 6, 2026 • updated October 20, 2026 • 8 min read

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Short answer

By the fact that people’s behaviour changed in specific situations. The change is visible in data collected independently of the training, when the state before the session is compared with a measurement repeated several months later. Attendance, the final test score and the course rating describe how the training went, not its effect. Assessing effectiveness is not purely a management matter either. The GDPR lists regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of the processing among the measures implemented as appropriate (Article 32(1)(d)). The Polish KSC Act (the Act on the National Cybersecurity System) lists policies and procedures for assessing the effectiveness of measures as a separate element of the information security management system, which essential and important entities implement as a rule (Article 8(1)(2)(h)).

Why the question comes up at all

The question usually comes up at two moments. The first is the budget conversation, when the board wants to know what the organisation got for the money spent on training. The second is harder. After an incident it turns out that the mistake was made by people who had been trained. Their attendance had been documented. In both situations the organisation has a full set of evidence that the training took place. Yet it has nothing that would show what changed after it.

The source of the doubt is the way the rules frame the obligation. Apart from the annual training of the head of the entity and the person entrusted with the head’s cybersecurity duties (Article 8e(1) and (3) of the KSC Act), the rules frame staff training primarily through the required outcome. The head of an essential or important entity ensures that staff are aware of their cybersecurity obligations and know the entity’s internal rules in that area (Article 8d(4) of the KSC Act). The Act also lists staff education among the measures of the information security management system, without describing its form (Article 8(1)(2)(i)). A controller implements measures appropriate to the risk to ensure that processing complies with the GDPR and to be able to demonstrate this (Article 24(1) GDPR). Training is one of the tools leading to that state and not the state itself.

The NIS2 Directive names outright the capability the training is meant to give. Members of the management body are required to follow training “in order that they gain sufficient knowledge and skills to enable them to identify risks and assess cybersecurity risk-management practices and their impact on the services provided by the entity” (Article 20(2)). That is a ready-made assessment criterion. If after the training a board member still cannot judge whether the measures adopted match the organisation’s risk, the objective set out in the directive has not been achieved despite a signed certificate.

Remember

A certificate of attendance is evidence of presence, not evidence of competence.

Telling those two things apart is the basis of assessing training.

What to establish before deciding

What exactly was supposed to change

The effect cannot be measured if nobody wrote down before the training what was supposed to be different. “Raising awareness” is not a verifiable objective. It does not identify a person, a situation or a behaviour.

A verifiable objective describes behaviour in a specific process. In an organisation with distributed customer service that may be verifying the recipient before sending a document containing personal data. In a finance team — confirming a change of bank account number through a channel other than the one the request arrived on. Among process owners — submitting new processing for assessment before it goes live and not after the first complaint.

That record also settles the format of the session. Behaviour changes through an exercise carried out in conditions close to the real ones, less often after a lecture on general principles.

What the state was before the training

Without a baseline every later result is a number without meaning. The share of suspicious messages reported is a good or a bad result only against what the same organisation recorded earlier.

The organisation usually already has the data needed to build a baseline. The record of breaches kept under Article 33(5) GDPR covers all breaches, including those not reported to the authority, so it shows how often errors of a given type recur. To that are added internal reports to the security team and matters referred to the data protection officer. If the organisation is only now putting in order how such events are recognised and classified, putting the assessment of incidents and breaches in order is a step that comes before measuring training effectiveness. Without a reliable record you measure the quality of the register and not people’s behaviour.

Which data show the effect and which only the activity

The split of indicators into activity and effect is a practical assessment based on the typical arrangement of a medium or large organisation. It does not follow from any provision and needs adapting to the processes and risks of the particular entity.

AreaActivity indicatorEffect indicator
Email and phishingShare of people who completed the training moduleShare of suspicious messages reported by employees and the time from delivery to the first report
Errors in correspondenceScore in a knowledge test on dispatch rulesNumber of events of the same type in the breach record in successive periods
Recognising breachesNumber of training hoursShare of events detected by employees rather than by IT or by the data subject
New processes and systemsAttendance of process owners at the workshopNumber of processing operations submitted for assessment before go-live
Head of the entity and the person under Article 8e(1) (KSC)Documented attendance at training (Article 8e(3))Decisions taken after the training on the information security management system, allocation of tasks and oversight of their performance (Article 8d(1) and (3))

The indicators in the second column are needed, because they describe the course and reach of the programme. But the decisive ones are those in the third column, because only they speak about behaviour. The last row shows this most sharply. The Act requires attendance at training to be documented (Article 8e(3)). By contrast the scope of the training covers the performance of the obligations listed in Article 8e(2), including the tasks under Article 8d. Their performance shows the effect of the training.

A useful reference when building such a set is AR-in-a-Box, the toolkit of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) for awareness-raising programmes. The toolkit describes each metric by, among other things, its indicators and means of measurement. It has five key performance indicators (KPIs). Besides the reach of activities and the behavioural change achieved, they are facilitating multipliers, public perception and durability. This is good practice rather than a legal requirement. Its value lies in forcing the measures to be set before the programme starts, not after it.

When to measure

Measuring immediately after the session measures recall of the content. Measuring several months later measures the change in behaviour, which is what the training was about. A programme settled solely on a final test therefore gives a picture systematically better than the facts.

The second caveat concerns a single result. One measurement does not tell the effect of the training apart from seasonality, a change in mail traffic or a campaign that happened to hit the organisation. A conclusion emerges only from a series of measurements taken at the same rhythm, and that requires deciding in advance who runs them and where the data come from.

What to do when no effect is visible

The absence of change does not automatically mean the training was poor. Three explanations are possible and it is worth checking them in this order.

  1. The measure is measuring something else. A rise in the number of reports is often read as deterioration, although it may also mean that people have started reporting instead of hiding.
  2. The process forces a workaround. If the correct behaviour takes more time than the incorrect one or requires permissions the employee does not have, training will not reverse that.
  3. The training did not match the situation. Generic material prepared without knowledge of the organisation’s processes changes behaviour in none of them.

The order matters in practice. Repeating the training is the most common response to a lack of effect and the least often the right one, because the first two explanations lie outside the training room.

How to evidence the effect rather than mere attendance

The accountability principle (Article 5(2) GDPR) places the burden of proof on the controller. In the cybersecurity regime the counterpart is the requirement to have policies and procedures for assessing the effectiveness of measures (Article 8(1)(2)(h) of the KSC Act). This does not apply to entities that implement a system compliant with Annex 4 instead of Article 8(1) (Article 8(3)) or to the banking and financial market infrastructure sectors (Article 8i(1)). In both regimes the document is not only the result but also the trace of the decision the result triggered.

What has evidential value is a set that allows the reasoning to be reconstructed. It consists of the training objective written down as a behaviour, the measurement before and after the session, the conclusion drawn from the comparison and the decision taken on that basis together with its date. In essential and important entities, documenting the attendance of the head of the entity at training remains a standalone obligation (Article 8e(3) of the KSC Act). The record of attendance shows that the training took place, not that anything changed. How to keep that record is described in How to document training so that it serves as evidence for the authority?.

In an organisation that has designated a data protection officer, monitoring of this area has an assigned addressee. Monitoring compliance by the data protection officer expressly covers awareness-raising, training of staff involved in processing operations “and the related audits” (Article 39(1)(b) GDPR). An audit of the training programme therefore falls within the officer’s tasks. The obligation to assess the effectiveness of the measures nevertheless rests with the controller (Article 24(1) and Article 32(1)(d) GDPR).

Supervisory practice shows the consequences of not assessing effectiveness regularly. In decision DKN.5131.34.2023 of 13 June 2026 the President of the UODO established that before the breach the controller had not regularly tested or measured the effectiveness of the measures intended to ensure the security of processing. The controller introduced the risk analysis, new procedures and staff training only after the breach came to light, during the proceedings. The President of the UODO took these actions into account in the controller’s favour as a mitigating factor (Article 83(2)(k) GDPR) and reduced the fine by 50%. The infringement of the GDPR was nevertheless found for the whole period from 25 May 2018 until the non-compliance was remedied in 2023. Actions taken after the event can therefore reduce the fine, but they do not replace evidence from the period the proceedings concern.

The transitional layer matters for planning the measurement. Entities that on the day the amendment to the KSC Act entered into force met the criteria for being treated as an essential or important entity implement the obligations under Chapter 3 within 12 months of its entry into force. These obligations include implementing an information security management system, and the deadline is 3 April 2027. An organisation that starts measuring effectiveness only towards the end of that period will have no baseline from before the system was implemented.

Most common mistakes

  • Confusing the rating of the training with the assessment of its effect. A satisfaction survey tells you how participants rated the trainer. It says nothing about behaviour once they are back at work.
  • Measuring only on the day of the training. A test right after the session checks short-term memory and systematically flatters the programme.
  • Treating a rise in the number of reports as a bad result. It may be the first visible sign that the training works, not that security has deteriorated.
  • Measuring the whole organisation with a single indicator. An averaged result hides the team where nothing changed, and it is that team that sets the risk.
  • Closing the matter by repeating the training. Without checking whether the problem lies in the process, further sessions add evidence of activity and do not change the result.

Conclusions and next steps

The question “did the training work” can be answered only once it has been established what was supposed to change and where it will be visible. An organisation that establishes this before commissioning a session gets two things at once. These are a programme matched to its own processes and evidence of the effectiveness of training as an organisational measure.

A sequence that works when putting this area in order.

  1. Write down the objective of each training as a behaviour in a specific process, not as a session topic.
  2. Set the baseline from data you already have. These are the breach record, internal reports and matters referred to the officer.
  3. Choose one effect indicator and one activity indicator for each group — the first for conclusions, the second to demonstrate reach.
  4. Plan a second measurement several months later and name the person who will carry it out.
  5. Before you order a repeat session, check whether the correct behaviour is feasible in the process concerned.
  6. Write down the decision taken on the basis of the result together with its date — it shows that the result served a purpose.

Once those steps are in place, the assessment of training no longer depends on the impression left by the session. The organisation shows what changed, where it is visible and what it decided to do next.

Sources

  • Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (GDPR), Article 5(2), Article 24(1), Article 32(1)(d), Article 39(1)(b) and Article 83(2)(k), consolidated text — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
  • Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System, Article 8(1)(2) and Article 8(3), Articles 8d and 8e, Article 8i(1) and Annex 4, consolidated text — Chancellery of the Sejm, ISAP: isap.sejm.gov.pl (in Polish)
  • Act of 23 January 2026 amending the Act on the National Cybersecurity System and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2026, item 252), Article 33(1) — Journal of Laws: dziennikustaw.gov.pl (in Polish)
  • Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council (NIS2), Article 20(2) and Article 21(2) — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
  • Decision of the President of the UODO DKN.5131.34.2023 of 13 June 2026 — case-law database of the Personal Data Protection Office: orzeczenia.uodo.gov.pl (in Polish)
  • AR-in-a-Box — a toolkit for building awareness-raising programmes together with proposed indicators for assessing their effectiveness, version 3 (2023) — European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA): enisa.europa.eu

Let us agree how you will recognise the effect of the next training

If the training programme in your organisation ends today with an attendance list, let us start by naming the behaviours that are to change. We will then identify the data in which the change will be visible. We design training and workshops from that decision, not from the topic of the session.

Author

Michał Rutkowski — LabLogic. He combines the legal, organisational and technological perspective in his work with the boards of medium-sized and large organisations: support for and performance of the DPO role, preparation for NIS2 and the Polish KSC Act, incident response, audits and training. Contact: M.Rutkowski@LabLogic.pl · LinkedIn

This material is general and educational in nature. It is not an individual legal opinion or a recommendation for any specific organisation. The scope of the obligations should be assessed against the situation of the organisation concerned.

Legal status: November 2026.

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