Let’s talk
Wondering how this plays out in your organisation? Get in touch — I answer personally.
Brief Answer
Not every one. Reporting to the President of UODO is the rule — a controller can only deviate from it if its assessment indicates that the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The report must be made without undue delay and, where feasible, no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of the breach — not after its occurrence. The standard is “without undue delay”; 72 hours is a limit, not a period to be used up. Notifying the data subjects is a separate decision and only arises in cases of high risk. However, the controller must document every breach, including one it has not reported. A processor in turn notifies the controller of every breach it becomes aware of without undue delay and with no risk threshold.
Have an incident right now? Find out in 5 minutes
The “I have an incident – what now?” tool gives a preliminary indication of which deadlines under the GDPR and the Polish KSC Act are already running. At the end, you can download an action plan as a PDF. Free of charge, no account required and no cookies.
Why this question arises at all
The doubt has two sources, both organizational, not legal.
First, not every security incident is a personal data breach. A blocked login or a detected and repelled phishing attempt is not a breach where it did not compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of personal data. A server outage, by contrast, has to be assessed for any loss of availability of personal data, including a temporary one. A breach is an incident that led to accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data. Until an organization resolves this qualification, discussion about reporting is premature.
Second, some organizations adopt the principle of “we report everything, just in case.” A report should still result from a risk assessment rather than replace it. The EDPB states that if in doubt the controller should notify the breach (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 119). According to the EDPB, there is no penalty for reporting an incident that ultimately transpires not to be a breach (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 60). The President of UODO stresses in the guide that a notification in itself does not indicate the notifying party’s fault. By contrast, not reporting without a documented analysis is difficult to defend.
Added to this is the mechanics of the deadline. Seventy-two hours are counted from the controller becoming aware of the breach, not from the moment the incident occurred. In large organizations, most of this time is usually consumed by the information flow. It runs from the employee, through the supervisor and IT department, to the data protection officer. The decision is made at the end of this path, and only then is it clear how much time realistically remains.
It is also worth noting that the reporting threshold itself is subject to legislative work. The European Commission’s proposal from the Digital Omnibus package envisages raising the reporting threshold to high risk, extending the deadline to 96 hours, and establishing a common point for receiving reports. This is a project at the stage of work in the European Parliament and the Council — until the changes are adopted and enter into force, the existing rules apply, and current breaches should be assessed according to them.
What needs to be determined before making a decision
Whether the incident is a personal data breach
Qualification covers three dimensions. These are confidentiality (data reached an unauthorized person), integrity (data was altered unlawfully or accidentally), and availability (data was lost or access to it is impossible). Loss of availability is sometimes overlooked, although it is a breach just like a leak. A ransomware attack on personal data is a breach even where the organization quickly restored the data from a backup. The EDPB treats such an attack as a breach even where the data was restored within a few hours and day-to-day operations were not affected (Guidelines 01/2021, paragraphs 16–17).
This determination only answers the question of “whether GDPR is even applicable.” It does not yet prejudge anything about reporting.
When the organization became aware of the breach
The 72-hour deadline runs from becoming aware of the breach. According to the EDPB, this happens when the controller has a reasonable degree of certainty that a security incident has led to personal data being compromised (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 31). How to count this deadline at weekends, during the preliminary investigation and when information comes from a processor is described in How to count the 72 hours for notifying a personal data breach?.
What risk arises for data subjects, not for the organization
This is the point where perspectives most often diverge. The assessment concerns the consequences for data subjects — identity theft, financial fraud, disclosure of highly sensitive information, discrimination, financial loss, damage to reputation. The controller’s reputational risk is not part of this analysis.
The assessment combines two dimensions. These are the likelihood of the consequence occurring and the severity of its impact on the rights or freedoms of the individual. In its judgment of 1 October 2025 (III OSK 1830/22) the Supreme Administrative Court indicated that a probability that is not low combined with a high severity of potential impact determines the possibility of high risk and that the obligation to notify does not require the individual’s rights to have already been actually violated. The Court also confirmed that the disclosure of a PESEL number along with a name and surname creates a high risk. For practical purposes, this means one thing. The argument “nothing has happened” does not rule out risk, because the assessment covers risk and not damage that has already occurred. However, the EDPB treats some circumstances as mitigating risk, such as a recipient bound by professional secrecy who deleted the file on request (Guidelines 01/2021, paragraph 81).
The analysis is structured by EDPB guidelines containing eighteen example cases — ransomware, data exfiltration, internal risk, lost devices, incorrect correspondence dispatch, social engineering — along with an indication of when the obligation to report and notify arises in each of them. The guidelines are not a source of law but define supervisory practice and are a good reference point for building one’s own assessment criteria.
Is the risk high — i.e., the second, separate decision
Reporting to the authority and notifying data subjects are two different obligations with different thresholds. Reporting to the UODO is only waived when the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. Notifying data subjects arises in the opposite scenario — only when the risk is high — and must occur without undue delay, without a rigid hourly deadline.
The GDPR provides for three situations where notifying data subjects is not required despite high risk. The first applies when the controller had implemented appropriate protection measures beforehand and applied them to the data affected by the breach. This means in particular encryption that renders the data unintelligible to unauthorized persons. The second applies when the controller has taken subsequent measures which ensure that the high risk is no longer likely to materialize. The third applies when individual notification would involve disproportionate effort. In that case the controller issues a public communication or uses a similar measure that informs data subjects in an equally effective manner. Invoking the first of these exceptions requires demonstrating that the security measure was effective at the time of the breach; a declaration that “the data was encrypted” without specifying the scope and method of key management does not close the case. The EDPB states that where the controller has no adequate backups, a loss or alteration of encrypted data would require communication to data subjects despite the encryption (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 76). The decision to rely on an exception is not the controller’s alone. The supervisory authority may require the data subjects to be notified or may decide that a condition waiving notification has been met (Article 34(4) GDPR).
Which authority and what parallel obligations apply
The obligation to notify a breach to the supervisory authority lies with the controller (Article 33(1) GDPR). A processor notifies the controller of every breach it becomes aware of without undue delay and with no risk threshold (Article 33(2) GDPR). The EDPB states that the processor does not need to first assess the risk, because it is the controller that must make this assessment (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 44).
For cross-border processing, it is necessary to determine whether the President of UODO is the lead authority or if the authority of another country is competent. A controller not established in the Union but subject to the GDPR does not benefit from the one-stop-shop mechanism. The EDPB states that such a controller must notify the breach to the supervisory authorities of all Member States where affected data subjects reside (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 73). The appointment of an EU representative does not change this.
Regardless of the GDPR, the same incident may trigger other regimes. These are obligations towards a CSIRT for entities covered by the Polish KSC Act, sectoral obligations arising from DORA, the Polish Electronic Communications Law or the eIDAS Regulation. The deadlines and thresholds in these are different. Essential and important entities in the banking and financial market infrastructure sectors report major ICT-related incidents under DORA. The provisions of the KSC Act on notifying significant incidents do not apply to them, subject to the exceptions in Article 8i of the KSC Act. An electronic communications service provider notifies the President of UODO of breaches of data processed in connection with telecommunications services under Article 402 of the Polish Electronic Communications Law (Article 95 GDPR). The EDPB notes that unlike Article 33(1) GDPR the breach notification requirements of Directive 2009/136/EC for providers of publicly available electronic communications services state that all relevant breaches have to be notified (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 75). Organizations that are just setting up this area usually start by determining the scope of obligations within the framework of preparation for NIS2 and KSC, and only then combine the reporting paths into a single procedure.
Four typical resolutions
| Situation | Report to UODO | Notify data subjects | What remains in the documentation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security incident with no impact on personal data | No | No | Register of security incidents; justification of qualification if the signal concerned data |
| Breach where a risk to data subjects is unlikely to arise | No | No | Entry in the breach register along with risk assessment and basis for the decision not to report |
| Breach with risk that is not high | Yes — without undue delay, where feasible within 72 hours of becoming aware | No | Entry in the register, report, correspondence with the authority, remedial actions |
| Breach with high risk | Yes — without undue delay, where feasible within 72 hours of becoming aware | Yes, without undue delay — unless one of the exceptions applies | Entry in the register, report, content and method of notification or justification for the exception |
The same type of incident, for example sending correspondence to the wrong recipient, may lead to different resolutions. This depends on the data in the attachment and on who received it.
Most common mistakes
- Counting the deadline from the incident instead of from becoming aware. Leads either to unnecessary haste or — more often — to the belief that the deadline has already passed, and to giving up on reporting.
- Treating 72 hours as a deadline to resolve the matter. The GDPR allows the information to be provided in phases without undue further delay where it cannot be provided at the same time (Article 33(4) GDPR). The first notification contains what is already known. The notification must ultimately contain at least a description of the nature of the breach, including where possible the categories and approximate number of data subjects and of personal data records concerned. It must also give the name and contact details of the data protection officer or other contact point, the likely consequences and the measures taken or proposed to address the breach (Article 33(3) GDPR). Reporting after the deadline requires an explanation for the delay. Waiting for complete findings is riskier than an incomplete report.
- Risk assessment from the organization’s perspective. The question is what threatens individuals, not how the incident appears from the outside.
- Overlooking availability breaches. Data loss and lack of access to it are breaches even if no unauthorized person saw the data.
- Lack of documentation of unreported breaches. Article 33(5) GDPR does not require a “register” as such, but documentation of every breach. The documentation covers at least the circumstances of the breach, its effects and the remedial action taken. It must enable the supervisory authority to verify compliance with the whole of Article 33 GDPR. During an inspection, it is this documentation that shows that the decision not to report was a decision, not an oversight.
- Notification to data subjects written in legalistic language. The communication must describe the breach in clear and plain language (Article 34(2) GDPR). The recipient should understand from it what happened and what they can do. A communication that the recipient does not understand does not meet this requirement.
Conclusions and next steps
The decision is made in two steps. First comes the qualification of the incident, then the risk assessment for data subjects.
Remember
The reporting obligation is a rule from which a controller can only deviate based on a documented assessment — not the other way around.
In practice, most problems stem not from the decision itself, but from what precedes it. Therefore, before the next breach, four things need to be decided. These are who in the organization has the right to determine that the controller has become aware of a breach; how the signal from the front line reaches the data protection officer and within what timeframe; according to what criteria the risk to data subjects is assessed, so that two different people reach a similar result; and where the assessment and the justification for the decision are recorded.
An organization that has these four elements makes a reporting decision within a few hours and can later demonstrate it. An organization that does not have them starts building the procedure during the breach — and this, usually, not the incident itself, determines the course of the matter.
Related materials
- How to determine if an organization must appoint a DPO? — a role that advises the controller on the risk assessment and acts as the contact point for the supervisory authority.
- Where should the board begin preparing for NIS2? — the order of decisions determining whether a parallel obligation to CSIRT runs alongside reporting to the UODO.
- What should a personal data breach register contain? — how to record the outcome of the risk assessment and the reasons for not notifying.
- How to count the 72 hours for notifying a personal data breach? — the moment of becoming aware of a breach and counting the notification deadline.
- How do you notify data subjects of a breach and what must the communication contain? — the content, channel and exceptions for communicating a breach to data subjects at high risk.
- How and when must a processor notify a personal data breach to the controller? — when and how a provider notifies the controller of a breach in its system.
- What must the controller do when a provider reports a personal data breach? — risk assessment and notification when the provider reports the breach.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (GDPR), Art. 4(12), Art. 33, Art. 34 and Art. 95, consolidated text — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
- Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System (KSC Act), Article 8i, consolidated text — Chancellery of the Sejm, ISAP: isap.sejm.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Act of 12 July 2024 – Electronic Communications Law, Article 402, consolidated text — Chancellery of the Sejm, ISAP: isap.sejm.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Proposal for a Regulation amending, inter alia, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (Digital Omnibus), COM(2025) 837 — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
- Which breaches must be reported to the President of UODO, and which do not require reporting? — Office for Personal Data Protection: uodo.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Within what period should a breach be reported to the President of UODO? — Office for Personal Data Protection: uodo.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Other obligations and regulations related to breaches — Office for Personal Data Protection: uodo.gov.pl (in Polish)
- When, in the event of a breach, should data subjects be notified? Important judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court (announcement of 24 October 2025 on the judgment of 1 October 2025, III OSK 1830/22) — Office for Personal Data Protection: uodo.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Guide on personal data breaches, version of 20 February 2025 — Office for Personal Data Protection: uodo.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Guidelines 01/2021 on examples regarding personal data breach notification, version 2.0, adopted 14 December 2021 — European Data Protection Board: edpb.europa.eu
- Guidelines 9/2022 on personal data breach notification under GDPR, version 2.0, adopted 28 March 2023 — European Data Protection Board: edpb.europa.eu
Organize your reporting decision before it’s needed
If, in your organization, the qualification of incidents and risk assessment for data subjects currently rely on the experience of individuals, it is worth establishing criteria and a decision-making path calmly. Incident and breach support includes situation assessment, reporting decisions, and organizing the response process.
This material is general and educational in nature. It is not an individual legal opinion or a recommendation for any specific organisation. The scope of the obligations should be assessed against the situation of the organisation concerned.
Legal status: November 2026.