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Short answer
First confirm the event and secure the evidence, then limit the effects. The legal assessment runs in parallel from the first hours, not after the technical work is finished. Detection starts several independent clocks at once. An essential or important entity within the meaning of the Polish KSC Act sends the CSIRT an early warning of a significant incident without undue delay, within 24 hours at the latest, and the significant incident notification within 72 hours at the latest. Both deadlines run from detection of the incident, and separate rules apply to a trust service provider and to an important entity that is a public entity (Article 11(1a) and Article 12c). Entities in the banking and financial market infrastructure sectors report under DORA instead. The controller notifies a personal data breach to the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of it. It does not notify where the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals. Where the risk is high, it also communicates the breach to the data subjects without undue delay, unless an exception under Article 34(3) GDPR applies. A processor notifies the breach to the controller, not to the authority. Contractual deadlines run from the moment set out in the contract. In the technical work the order of actions matters more than speed. Something done too early — for example restoring a system from backup before the evidence has been taken — closes off findings that cannot be reproduced later.
Have an incident right now? Choose what happened
The “I have an incident – what now?” tool shows the first steps for the selected event and gives a preliminary indication of which deadlines under the GDPR and the Polish KSC Act are already running. At the end, you can download an action plan as a PDF. Free of charge, no account required and no cookies.
An employee gave away a password via a fake email
Phishing — is it already a notifiable incident?
Someone has taken over a mailbox or a Microsoft 365 account
Compromised account — who has to be notified?
A work laptop or phone has gone missing
Lost laptop with data — do I notify the President of UODO?
An email with personal data went to the wrong person
Email to the wrong person — is it a breach?
Something is wrong, but I don’t know what
You don’t need to know what the event is called. The tool asks, step by step, what happened, when it was detected, whose data is involved and whether you are covered by the KSC Act.
Why this question arises at all
Most organizations have an incident response procedure, and most of those procedures describe the technical path. They say who takes the report, how to classify it, when to escalate. The question “what next” comes up at a different moment — once the event is confirmed, part of the systems is down, and several people are waiting for a decision at the same time. The procedure then says who is to do something, but rarely says in what order, and what not to do.
The second source of doubt is regulatory. The same event can trigger obligations under two or three regimes at once, and each of them counts time from something different. An essential or important entity within the meaning of the Polish KSC Act (Act on the National Cybersecurity System) responds to a significant incident from the moment it is detected. A controller within the meaning of the GDPR responds to a personal data breach from the moment it becomes aware of it. According to the EDPB the controller becomes aware when it has a reasonable degree of certainty that a security incident has led to personal data being compromised (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 31). Those two moments may fall in the same hour, but for events spread over time they can be days apart.
The third source is the most practical. The first hours decide what the organization will have available later. Traces in systems have limited durability. Logs rotate, volatile memory disappears after a restart, virtual machine snapshots are overwritten. A team that instinctively restores the service is acting rationally from a continuity perspective — and is at the same time destroying the material on which the assessment of the event’s scope, the content of the report to the authority and the conversation with the insurer were meant to rest.
What must be determined before the decision
Is the event confirmed and what exactly did it cover
A signal is not yet an incident. According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, the moment of detection is the identification of the event as an incident, not the moment it occurred (Q&A 6.5). The Minister also points out that the entity may obtain the information about the event from a service provider. Before the organization launches a full response, someone has to confirm that the event actually happened and provisionally establish its scope. That means which systems, which data, which period, whether access is still ongoing. The verification should be short and documented to the hour, because the rest of the chronology is counted from it. The Minister links the moment of detection to the moment at which the entity can establish that the event is an incident (Q&A 6.5). Prolonging the verification should therefore not move that moment.
Scope is established along three dimensions at once. These are what stopped working, what was changed and what may have been disclosed. The third dimension tends to be examined last. Any of the three, however, can decide the obligations towards the data protection authority. A personal data breach is a breach of security leading to unauthorised disclosure of or access to the data, but also to their accidental or unlawful destruction, loss or alteration (Article 4(12) GDPR). The EDPB states that the controller should not wait for a detailed forensic examination and (early) mitigation steps before assessing the risk (Guidelines 01/2021, paragraph 9). If a personal data breach cannot be ruled out, assume for working purposes that it may have occurred. Both tracks then run in parallel, because narrowing the findings is easier than making up lost time.
Who runs the case and who takes which decisions
In an effective response three roles are separated. Someone runs the case and keeps the chronology. Someone decides on technical action — cutting off a network segment, disabling an account, holding back a restore. Someone prepares the legal qualification and the reports. On the GDPR side the data protection officer advises, while the decision to notify is taken and signed by a person representing the controller. On the cybersecurity side this role belongs to the person responsible for obligations under the KSC Act.
These roles can be combined in a smaller organization, but they have to be named before the event. Under the KSC Act, responsibility for performing the obligations relating to incident handling and reporting rests with the head of the entity and does not disappear by delegating tasks to someone else — the Act provides for a separate financial penalty for the head of the entity, among other things for failing to perform the obligations relating to incident reporting and reporting duties. That penalty may first be imposed after 3 April 2028 (Article 35 of the amending act). The deferral does not change the notification deadlines. A simple organizational conclusion follows. Senior management has to learn about a significant incident early enough for reporting decisions to be taken within the deadline, not after it has passed.
Which clocks are already running
The deadlines have to be known in advance, because during the event there is no time to work them out.
- KSC Act — essential and important entities. The early warning of a significant incident is due without undue delay, no later than 24 hours from the moment of detection. The significant incident notification is due without undue delay, no later than 72 hours — also from the moment of detection, not from the early warning. This is the most common distortion in secondary sources and the most expensive one in practice, because it creates the illusion of three extra days.
- KSC Act — reporting after the notification. An interim report is submitted only at the request of the competent CSIRT. The final report — no later than one month from the date of the notification. If incident handling has not been completed by then, the entity submits a progress report and files the final report within one month of completion. The channel is the S46 central ICT system.
- GDPR — the controller. A breach is notified to the President of UODO without undue delay and, where feasible, no later than 72 hours after having become aware of it — unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The standard is “without undue delay”; 72 hours is a limit, not an allowance to be used up. A notification made after that point is accompanied by reasons for the delay. Where the full set of information cannot be gathered, the rules allow it to be provided in phases.
- GDPR — the processor. A processor that has become aware of a breach notifies the controller without undue delay. According to EDPB Guidelines 9/2022 the controller in principle becomes aware of the breach at the moment the processor has informed it of the breach. The data processing agreement should therefore set a specific time and channel for notification, and how to count the deadline is described in How to count the 72 hours for notifying a personal data breach?.
- Sectoral and contractual commitments. Financial entities have separate deadlines under the DORA Regulation and the technical standards adopted under it, and many customer contracts contain their own information commitments, usually shorter than the statutory ones. Essential and important entities in the banking and financial market infrastructure sectors report major ICT-related incidents under DORA, not under the KSC Act (Article 8i(1) of the Act). The obligations under the GDPR and under contracts run in parallel with the deadlines under the KSC Act or DORA.
Two transitional rules change the addressee of notifications and the moment from which the deadlines bind the organization.
Who the report actually goes to. The Act directs reports to the competent sectoral CSIRT, but the transitional provisions state that, until a communication is issued confirming that this CSIRT has reached operational capability, reports go to the competent CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or CSIRT GOV. The competent authorities have eighteen months from the entry into force of the amendment to establish the sectoral CSIRTs. Until such a communication is issued for a sector, the addressee is a national-level CSIRT. The exception is sectors in which a sectoral cybersecurity team was established before 2025 (Article 44(3) of the amending act). Such a team became the sectoral CSIRT on the entry into force of the amendment (Article 46 of the amending act) and is the addressee. Check which of these states your procedure reflects. Notifications are submitted through the S46 system (Article 11(2) of the Act). According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, the system routes them to the competent CSIRT and the teams forward notifications to one another according to competence (Q&A 6.13 and 7.2).
From when the reporting deadlines bind the organization. Entities that met the criteria for an essential or important entity on 3 April 2026 have until 3 April 2027 to implement the obligations under Chapter 3 of the Act (Article 33(1) of the amending act). Those obligations include notification of significant incidents. An entity that meets the criteria later has 12 months from the day it meets them to implement those obligations (Article 16 of the Act). For former operators of essential services, the period for moving to the new rules on notifying significant incidents ended on 3 October 2026 (Article 33(4) of the amending act).
Separate rules apply to two groups. A trust service provider reports a significant incident within 24 hours of detection. An important entity that is a public entity is exempt from submitting the early warning and the reports — interim, progress and final.
An organization’s qualification decides which of these clocks can apply to it at all. Whether any of them has started depends on the nature of the event. Organizations that do not have this settled in writing usually start by establishing the scope of obligations under NIS2 and KSC before merging the reporting paths into a single procedure.
When an event is a significant incident
Classification is not an intuitive judgement. The thresholds for treating an incident as significant — by type of event in particular sectors and subsectors — are set by the Council of Ministers by regulation, taking into account the number of users affected by the disruption, the duration of the incident’s impact on the service, the geographical reach and other sector-specific factors. Excluded from that delegation are entities for which the European Commission has set thresholds in Implementing Regulation 2024/2690. Some entities in the digital infrastructure, ICT service management and digital providers sectors apply them directly. Until a new national regulation is issued, the thresholds in the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 31 October 2018 apply, until 3 April 2027 at the latest (Article 32(1) of the amending act). It covers the sectors and subsectors of the former Annex 1 to the Act. An organization outside the scope of both the 2018 regulation and Regulation 2024/2690 has no threshold in implementing provisions today. It assesses the event against the definition of a significant incident in the Act (Article 2(7)).
The practical conclusion is that the thresholds have to be written into the procedure before the event, stating which source applies to the organization. Working this out during the first day eats up time that is not there.
What to secure before restoration begins
Limiting the effects and gathering evidence are not mutually exclusive, but they require an order. Before the environment is restored it is worth securing images of the affected systems and volatile memory, exporting logs from systems with short retention and saving the configuration in its pre-change state. Isolating a network segment is safer than switching a machine off, because it stops the attacker without erasing the state of the system.
In parallel, a single chronology of the event is kept. The record of who established or changed what, and when, later forms the basis of the report, the settlement with the insurer and the answers to the authority’s questions. Reconstructing that timeline a week after the event, from the memory of several people, produces a result that cannot be defended.
Who else has to be told
Beyond the authorities, the circle of those informed is set by the rules, by contractual relationships and by the actual impact of the event — in that order, because the first element tends to be overlooked.
The KSC Act imposes two information obligations on essential and important entities towards the users of their services. In the case of a significant cyber threat, the entity informs the users who may be affected about the preventive measures available to them; it informs them about the threat itself where doing so will not increase the level of risk to the security of the systems. In the case of a significant incident that has an adverse effect on the provision of services — it informs users about the incident. These are obligations, not communication decisions. Once their conditions are met, the question is “how and when”, not “whether”.
Next come the contractual relationships. Where the organization is a processor, its first addressees are the controllers for whom it processes data — and it is they, not it, who decide whether to notify the authority. Notifying the data subjects is a separate decision. It arises where there is a high risk to their rights and freedoms and has to take place without undue delay (Article 34(1) GDPR). It is not required where the affected data were protected by measures such as encryption that render them unintelligible to unauthorised persons, where the controller has subsequently eliminated the likelihood of a high risk or where it would involve disproportionate effort (Article 34(3) GDPR). In the last case a public communication or a similar measure informing individuals equally effectively takes its place. How to assess the risk is described in Does every data breach need to be reported?.
Internal communication requires the same discipline as external. A single source of information, one approved message and a clear statement of what is not yet known reduce the number of versions circulating around the organization — and it is those versions that most often end up outside it in a form nobody approved.
The first day — a checklist
Hours 0–4
- Confirm the event and record the date and time at which it was identified as an incident.
- Appoint the person running the case and start a single, shared chronology.
- Secure logs, system images and volatile memory before any restoration.
- Stop the spread. Isolate the segment, withdraw access, force a change of credentials.
- Establish the preliminary scope. This means the systems, the categories of data, the period and the estimated number of people whose data may have been affected.
- Check which regimes apply to the organization and enter into the chronology the hours at which the deadlines expire. The deadlines for the early warning (24 h) and the significant incident notification (72 h) run from detection of the incident, not one from the other. The 72 h GDPR deadline runs from becoming aware of the breach.
- Inform senior management to the extent needed to take decisions on reporting.
The first day
- Notify suppliers and the controllers towards whom the organization has contractual or statutory obligations.
- Prepare and send the early warning if the event is a significant incident — to the CSIRT competent today, not the target one.
- Decide whether a duty to inform the users of the services has arisen, and prepare the wording of the message.
- Carry out the risk assessment for individuals and decide whether to notify the President of UODO or not — together with the reasoning.
- Decide whether to communicate the breach to the data subjects. Where the risk is high, the communication is sent without undue delay unless an exception under Article 34(3) GDPR applies.
- Record the breach in the breach documentation regardless of whether it was notified.
Remember
The sequence only has value once a specific role — not a department — has been assigned to each point before the event.
Most common mistakes
- Restoring the service before securing the evidence. The most common mistake and the hardest to repair. After a restore from backup it is usually no longer possible to establish how long access lasted or what was taken.
- Adding 72 hours to the early warning. Both KSC deadlines run from detection of the incident. A procedure under which the notification is to be made “within 72 hours of the early warning” plans to miss the deadline.
- One field for the date of detection of the incident and of becoming aware of the breach. These are two separate findings. One concerns the impact on the service, the other the exposure of data. They may fall at the same moment — but with a single field the documentation cannot show when and on what basis the controller became aware of the breach.
- Writing the target addressee of reports into the procedure. Sectoral CSIRTs are only being set up. Until the communication on the operational capability of the competent sectoral CSIRT, notifications go to CSIRT MON, NASK or GOV. The exception is a sector in which a sectoral cybersecurity team was established before 2025. There the addressee is already the sectoral CSIRT.
- Assuming that a report to the CSIRT exhausts the obligations. Reports under different regimes have different addressees, different scope and different deadlines. None of them replaces the others. Nor do they replace the duty to inform the users of the services. In the banking and financial market infrastructure sectors the DORA report takes the place of the notification under the KSC Act, but not of the notification to the President of UODO (Article 8i(1) of the KSC Act, Article 33(1) GDPR).
- Treating loss of availability as a purely technical matter. Loss of access to personal data caused by a security incident is a personal data breach just as much as its disclosure, even if the backup worked.
- Scattered communication. Parallel messages from IT, customer service and the board, differing in content, create a bigger problem later than the event itself.
- Closing the case once the service is back. Without the final report, the conclusions and changes to safeguards, the organization returns to exactly the state in which the incident was possible.
Conclusions and next steps
After detecting an incident an organization takes not one decision but a sequence of decisions with different owners and different deadlines. Speed only helps where the order is right. That order is confirmation, securing the evidence and limiting the effects. Legal qualification and notifications run in parallel. Then come information for users, restoration and conclusions.
Five things are worth settling before the next event. Who has the right to declare an incident confirmed, and where that moment is recorded. What the minimum set of evidence secured every time looks like, regardless of the type of event. Which classification thresholds apply to the organization and where they come from. Which regimes apply to it, who prepares the report under each of them and to whom it is addressed. Who approves messages going outside.
An organization that has these elements settled spends the first hours on substantive work. An organization that does not spends them working out who is responsible for what — and it is usually that, rather than the scale of the event itself, that decides how the matter looks later in the documents.
Related materials
- Does every data breach need to be reported? — the notification threshold and the assessment of risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals, that is, the decision to which the first-day sequence leads.
- Cybersecurity incident vs personal data breach: what is the difference? — two qualifications of one event and two starting points for the deadlines.
- Does every organization fall under NIS2? — the entity qualification that decides whether, alongside the GDPR obligations, deadlines towards the CSIRT are also running.
- Where should the board begin preparing for NIS2? — the order of senior management actions once the entity’s status is established, including assigning responsibility for incident handling.
- What should a personal data breach register contain? — what of the first 24 hours ends up in the documentation.
- Who else needs NIS2 training besides the management board? — the circle of people beyond the head of the entity and how to derive it from Articles 8 and 11.
- What does a significant incident report to a CSIRT contain? — the four submissions to a CSIRT, their deadlines and the content the Act requires
- How to count the 72 hours for notifying a personal data breach? — when the controller’s deadline starts and how to count it on days off work.
- How do you notify data subjects of a breach and what must the communication contain? — the content and channel of the communication to data subjects when the risk assessment indicates a high risk.
- How and when must a processor notify a personal data breach to the controller? — the deadline and content of the notification when the organisation is a processor.
- How to prepare an incident response exercise? — preparing an exercise that tests this sequence before a real event.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (GDPR), Articles 4(12), 33 and 34, consolidated text — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
- Act of July 5, 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System, Article 2(7), Articles 8i, 11–12c and 16, consolidated text — Chancellery of the Sejm, ISAP: isap.sejm.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Act of January 23, 2026 amending the Act on the National Cybersecurity System and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2026, item 252), Articles 32, 33, 35, 42, 44 and 46 — transitional provisions on incident reporting, Journal of Laws: dziennikustaw.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of October 31, 2018 on the thresholds for recognising an incident as significant (Journal of Laws 2018, item 2180) — Chancellery of the Sejm, ISAP: isap.sejm.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 of October 17, 2024 — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
- Reporting a personal data breach — Personal Data Protection Office (UODO): uodo.gov.pl (in Polish)
- What is the deadline for notifying a breach to the President of UODO? — Personal Data Protection Office (UODO): uodo.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Questions and answers on the amendment to the Act on the National Cybersecurity System, October 2026 version, Q&A 6.5, 6.13 and 7.2 — Ministry of Digital Affairs: cyber.gov.pl (in Polish)
- Guidelines 9/2022 on personal data breach notification under GDPR, version 2.0, adopted March 28, 2023, paragraphs 31 and 44 — European Data Protection Board: edpb.europa.eu
- Guidelines 01/2021 on examples regarding personal data breach notification, version 2.0, adopted December 14, 2021, paragraph 9 — European Data Protection Board: edpb.europa.eu
Settle the order of actions before you need it
If incident response in your organization currently rests on the experience of a few people and on decisions taken in the middle of the event, it is worth putting that process in order calmly. Support with incidents and breaches covers assessment of the situation, decisions on reporting, communication and remedial action.
This material is general and educational in nature. It is not an individual legal opinion or a recommendation for any specific organisation. The scope of the obligations should be assessed against the situation of the organisation concerned.
Legal status: November 2026.