An employee entered their password in a fake email — is that already a breach to report?

Michał Rutkowski • for DPOs, security and IT teams • published November 22, 2026 • 12 min read

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Short answer

Phishing that ends with a disclosed password is a security incident. In my assessment it is also already a personal data breach, because the password assigned to the employee’s account has reached an unauthorised person. The controller documents every breach (Article 33(5) GDPR). Notification to the President of the UODO depends primarily on whether the attacker gained access to the account or to another system that accepts this password. The risk to individuals is usually unlikely where three conditions are met together. Complete logs of those systems from the moment the password was disclosed rule out the attacker’s access, the password has been changed with sessions revoked, and the account shows no changes by the attacker. Documentation demonstrating that the risk is unlikely is then sufficient. Where the attacker gained access or this cannot be ruled out, the controller notifies the breach without undue delay and where feasible within 72 hours, usually counted from the employee’s report or an earlier alert. It refrains from notifying only where the risk is unlikely in that situation as well. According to the EDPB it should notify if in doubt. Where the risk is high it communicates the breach to the data subjects, unless an exception under Article 34(3) applies.

An organisation processing data on behalf of clients does not have to assess the risk to their data first. In my assessment it notifies the disclosure of the password to each client whose data the attacker could reach with it, without undue delay and before the result of the log review. For data processed on its own behalf it is itself the controller.

Where an essential or important entity is already bound by the obligations under Chapter 3 of the KSC Act, it also handles the event as an incident. It is obliged to notify the CSIRT only of a significant incident (as a rule an early warning within 24 and a notification within 72 hours of detection). Phishing without the attacker’s access is usually not one, although in my assessment for some digital entities the disclosure of the password alone may be one. The entity performs these obligations within 12 months of meeting the criteria. Where it already met them on 3 April 2026 the deadline is 3 April 2027. A former operator of essential services applies the new reporting rules from 3 October 2026 at the latest. The banking and financial market infrastructure sectors report major ICT-related incidents under the DORA Regulation.

Has an employee disclosed a password? Check what to do now

The “I have an incident – what now?” tool shows the first steps after a password was entered on a fake page and gives a preliminary assessment of whether, and by when, the breach has to be notified to the President of the UODO. At the end, you can download an action plan as a PDF. Free of charge, no account required and no cookies.

Why this question arises at all

Organisations make two opposite mistakes. Some close the matter once the password is changed, without documentation or risk assessment. Others notify the President of the UODO of every disclosed password without checking whether the attacker entered the account.

What has to be established before a decision

Is phishing with a disclosed password a personal data breach

A personal data breach is a breach of security leading among other things to the unauthorised disclosure of or access to personal data (Article 4(12) GDPR). In my assessment a password assigned to a specific employee’s account is information relating to an identifiable person (Article 4(1)), because the login usually points to the employee. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) follows WP29 in referring to “personal data, such as passwords” (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 77). On that reading disclosing the password to the attacker is already an unauthorised disclosure of personal data, even if nobody has used it yet.

According to the UODO Guide a breach occurs where the event is a security incident and concerns personal data being processed. The third condition is that the event may lead to, among other things, their unauthorised disclosure or access to them (section 2.1). The Regulation is narrower on this point, because it speaks of a breach of security leading to those effects. On the Guide’s approach the breach also covers the data to which the password gives access.

The opposite reading can be defended. A breach would then arise only once the attacker accessed the data on the account. It is supported by the Guide’s reservation that a break-in to a room with documents does not breach confidentiality where the controller has evidence that the documents were not accessed (section 2.3). The first reading is supported by the EDPB case of a leak of hashed passwords from a website. The EDPB states that the confidentiality of the data is compromised. The breach should be documented, although neither notification nor communication is needed. For passwords the EDPB nonetheless strongly advises communication (Case No. 06 of Guidelines 01/2021, paragraphs 56, 61 and 62). The EDPB based the absence of risk in that case on hashing the passwords with an up-to-date method, among other things. Phishing gives the attacker the password in clear text.

The choice of reading determines the qualification of the event, the start of the 72 hours and the processor’s notification. I recommend applying the first reading in the procedure, because its consequences are safe under the opposite reading as well.

A repelled attempt is different. Where the employee recognised the phishing and neither entered nor ran anything, no personal data breach has occurred (Article 4(12) GDPR). According to the Guide the controller should also document an incident found not to be a breach, in particular the reason for that decision (section 8.1).

What to do in the first hour

I recommend that the employee report the disclosure of the password immediately under the procedure.

  • Logging the report. The person receiving the report records its time and informs the data protection officer and the person who classifies the incident.
  • Cutting off the attacker. The IT department immediately changes the password from a trusted device in all systems that accept it and revokes the account’s active sessions.
  • Reviewing changes on the account. The IT department records and then removes unknown mail rules and applications with access to the account. The same applies to two-factor login methods and devices added by the attacker, because they may allow the attacker to regain access.
  • Exporting the logs. The IT department saves the account’s sign-in and audit logs for the whole period since the password was disclosed, before their retention period expires.
  • The password elsewhere. The employee changes the same password in private services where they used it.
  • Warning and evidence. It is worth warning colleagues about the same message and keeping one copy of it with headers as evidence.

Did the attacker gain access to the account

Remember

The answer comes from the sign-in logs for the whole period from the moment the password was disclosed to the moment of the check, not only up to the password change.

In cloud services the non-interactive sign-ins in which an application uses a previously issued token must also be checked. Where the same password also opens a VPN, remote desktop or on-premises systems, their logs are checked as well.

Two-factor login does not protect where the employee also entered a code from a text message or an app on the fake page or approved a notification. The fake intermediary page then signs in at the same moment as the employee and takes over the session. That is why the IP address and device identifier are compared with those the employee uses. A matching browser rules nothing out, because the intermediary page usually passes on the employee’s browser data.

A sign-in with the correct password stopped at the second factor does not give the attacker access, but it confirms knowledge of the password and goes into the reasoning for the assessment. The attacker’s changes on the account are shown by the user directory and mailbox audit log. The current state of the settings will not show changes the attacker has deleted. For a system administrator’s password the log also shows new accounts, roles, applications and changes to sign-in policies.

When the 72 hours start

Notification to the President of the UODO takes place without undue delay and where feasible not later than 72 hours after becoming aware of the breach (Article 33(1) GDPR). According to the Guide the controller becomes aware of a breach when it realises that the detected event meets the three conditions of a breach from section 2.1 (section 5.2). In phishing that knowledge usually comes with the employee’s report. On the first reading the deadline therefore runs from that report or from an earlier alert of a security system, if that alert was the first to show the password being disclosed.

On the opposite reading the log review would be a short period of investigation before becoming aware (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraphs 31 and 34). According to the Guide waiting for the end of an internal investigation or risk assessment should not, however, justify a delay in notification (section 9.2).

When phishing ends with documenting the breach

The controller does not have to notify a breach where it is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons (Article 33(1) GDPR). In phishing such an assessment is usually justified where three conditions are met together.

  • The logs of all systems that accept this password cover the whole period from its disclosure to the moment of the check and rule out the attacker’s access, including in non-interactive sign-ins.
  • The password has been changed in all systems that accept it and the account’s sessions have been revoked.
  • The account shows no changes added by the attacker in mail, mailbox permissions or sign-in methods. In mail this means rules that move, delete or forward messages. In sign-in methods it means new devices, applications with access and second factors, including those deleted later.

In a similar example from the UODO Guide discarded documents with PESEL numbers were recovered from a container on the company’s closed and monitored premises, and recordings confirmed that no unauthorised persons had access. According to the Guide the absence of risk could then be clearly established (section 7.1). The Guide stresses, however, that breaches not requiring notification are exceptional situations and that the controller must be able to demonstrate the absence of risk (section 9.1).

The documentation covers the facts relating to the breach, its effects and the remedial action taken (Article 33(5) GDPR). It may take the form of an entry in a breach register, although according to the Guide a separate register is not mandatory (section 8.1). According to the Guide the controller should record precisely the time of becoming aware of the breach (section 5.2). The EDPB recommends documenting the reasoning for decisions. If a breach is not notified, a justification should be documented with the reasons why the risk was considered unlikely (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 125).

When phishing must be notified to the President of the UODO

The attacker’s access changes the assessment. The scope of data covered by the assessment is narrowed by an audit log of access to messages and files, if it covers the whole period of the attacker’s access. Without such a log all the data on the account counts, and for a system administrator’s account the data of the whole system. The controller should consider the severity of the potential impact on the rights and freedoms of individuals together with its likelihood (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 119).

A situation in which access cannot be ruled out is assessed in a similar way. This is the case with an incomplete log or with a second factor used during the phishing, if comparing addresses and devices does not rule out a sign-in by the attacker. According to the EDPB the controller should notify the breach if in doubt (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 119). Missing information may be provided in phases without undue further delay (Article 33(4) GDPR).

When data subjects must be informed

Communication to data subjects is a separate decision. The controller communicates the breach to the data subject without undue delay where it is likely to result in a high risk to their rights and freedoms (Article 34(1) GDPR). According to the UODO Guide a high risk may be indicated by, among other things, financial data and data concerning health. The Guide also lists the PESEL number and the series and number of an identity card. A high risk may also be indicated by the particular severity of possible consequences such as identity theft or financial fraud (section 7.1).

In Case No. 18 of Guidelines 01/2021 the attacker gained access to the email accounts of a hypermarket chain and through forwarding rules obtained data of 99 employees, including salaries. The EDPB found that the breach was likely to result in a high risk. All 99 employees should have been informed and not only the 10 the controller had notified (paragraph 129).

Communication is not required in the three situations under Article 34(3) GDPR. Encryption and other measures under point (a) usually do not help, because an attacker signed in to the employee’s account sees the data as the employee does. The others are subsequent measures that ensure the high risk is no longer likely to materialise (point (b)) and disproportionate effort. With such effort the controller makes a public communication or takes a similar measure that is equally effective (point (c)). The content and channel of the communication are described in How do you notify data subjects of a breach and what must the communication contain?.

Must phishing be reported to the CSIRT

For an essential or important entity phishing with a disclosed password is also an incident within the meaning of the Polish Act on the National Cybersecurity System (KSC). An incident is an event that has or may have an adverse effect on the security of information systems (Article 2(5)). The entity ensures the handling of the incident and classifies it against the thresholds for recognising an incident as significant (Article 11(1)(1) and (3)).

The entity is obliged to report to the CSIRT only a significant incident. It causes or may cause severe degradation in the quality or interruption of the continuity of the service, financial loss for the entity or affects other persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage (Article 2(7)). The thresholds are to be set by a new regulation of the Council of Ministers (Article 11(4)). The previous ones remain in force until 3 April 2027 at the latest (Article 32 of the amending act of 23 January 2026). Where no thresholds apply, the definition alone decides, and phishing without the attacker’s access after the password change and session revocation usually does not meet it. With the attacker’s access the incident may be significant, for example with fake invoices sent from the compromised mailbox (Article 2(7)). For some digital entities the thresholds are set by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 (Article 1). For all of these entities a successful, suspectedly malicious and unauthorised access to network and information systems capable of causing severe operational disruption is significant (point (e) of Article 3(1)). For cloud computing service providers, managed service providers and most of the other entities concerned an incident is also significant where the confidentiality of data related to the provision of the service is compromised as a result of a suspectedly malicious action (point (c) of Articles 7 to 13). In my assessment this may already cover disclosing the password to an account used to provide the service, although the provisions require a breach of the confidentiality of data related to the service.

As a rule the entity submits an early warning to the competent sectoral CSIRT without undue delay and no later than 24 hours after detection. It submits the notification of a significant incident without undue delay and no later than 72 hours after detection, while a trust service provider does so within 24 hours (Article 11(1)(4) and (4a) and Article 11(1a)). Until the announcement of the operational capability of the sectoral CSIRT, entities report to the competent CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or CSIRT GOV (Article 44(1) of the amending act). Where a sectoral team was established before 2025 the report goes to it as the sectoral CSIRT (Article 44(3) and Article 46 of the amending act). The deadlines run from the detection of a significant incident and not from becoming aware of a breach under the GDPR. I recommend counting them from the report of the disclosed password and closing the classification within the first hours, in parallel with the log review.

The entity performs the obligations under Chapter 3 of the Act, including reporting significant incidents, within 12 months of meeting the criteria (Article 16 of the Act). Where the entity already met them on the date the amending act entered into force (3 April 2026, one month after its publication on 2 March 2026), the deadline expires on 3 April 2027 (Article 33(1) and Article 49 of the amending act). For former operators of essential services the 6-month period for moving to the new reporting rules ended on 3 October 2026 (Article 33(4) of the amending act). The banking and financial market infrastructure sectors as a rule neither classify nor report significant incidents under the Act (Article 8i(1)) but report major ICT-related incidents (Article 2(11h)) under the DORA Regulation.

What the outcome looks like after phishing

For an essential or important entity every variant with a disclosed password is an incident to be handled and classified independently of the GDPR.

The organisation processes the employee’s password itself as the controller (Article 4(7) GDPR). On the first reading and the approach in section 2.1 of the Guide the breach also covers clients’ data that the attacker could reach with this password. Where the organisation processes those data on behalf of a client, as a processor it notifies the breach to that client without undue delay (Article 33(2) GDPR). The deadline may be specified in the data processing agreement (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 46). Where the breach covers data of several clients or group companies, the processor notifies each of them (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 47). The EDPB recommends prompt notification and providing further information in phases (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 45). On the opposite reading the processor notifies the breach to the clients whose data the logs show the attacker accessed or do not rule out such access. The processor does not first have to assess the risk, because the assessment lies with the controller (Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 44).

SituationOutcomeBasisDecisive circumstances, exceptions and limits
The employee recognised the phishing and neither entered nor ran anythingno personal data breach; documenting the qualification with the reasonArticle 4(12) GDPR; Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 15; UODO Guide, section 8.1for an essential or important entity usually a near miss under Article 2(11e) of the KSC Act; sharing information with the CSIRT voluntary (Article 13)
Password disclosed and the attacker did not gain accessdocumenting the breach (on the opposite reading the incident) with reasoning and no notification to the President of the UODOArticle 33(1), (2) and (5) GDPR; UODO Guide, sections 7.1 and 8.1; Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 125three conditions together; the controller must be able to demonstrate the absence of risk; the assessment is revisited when new facts arise; on the first reading and the Guide’s approach the processor notifies the client
Password disclosed and the attacker gained accessnotification to the President of the UODO; communication to data subjects where the risk is highArticle 33(1) and Article 34(1) GDPR; Guidelines 01/2021, Case No. 18risk according to the data on the account (a complete audit log of access narrows the scope), for a system administrator’s account according to the whole system; no notification only where the risk is unlikely; exceptions to communication under Article 34(3)
Password disclosed and access cannot be ruled outnotification to the President of the UODO; communication to data subjects where the risk is highArticle 33(1) and Article 34(1) GDPR; Guidelines 9/2022, paragraph 119an incomplete log or a second factor used during the phishing without ruling out a sign-in by the attacker; notification if in doubt; exceptions to communication under Article 34(3)

Common mistakes

  • Checking only the account of the person who reported. It is worth identifying in the mail system all recipients of the fake message and checking sign-ins from the attacker’s IP address on their accounts.
  • No review of the messages sent from the account. The attacker often sends further phishing or fake invoices from the compromised mailbox.

Conclusions and next steps

Notification to the President of the UODO is usually decided by a quick and complete log review.

  • Set out in the procedure to whom the employee reports the disclosed password and how quickly.
  • Decide who retrieves the sign-in logs and whether the system keeps them long enough. In cloud services the retention period usually depends on the licence plan, and a short log makes it harder to rule out the attacker’s access.
  • Name the person who decides on notification on behalf of the management board, and that person’s deputy. The data protection officer advises, and the final decision on the risk assessment is taken by the controller (Guide, sections 3.6 and 7.1).
  • Prepare a breach documentation template for phishing with the time of the report, the period covered by the logs, their export and the reasoning for the assessment.

Related materials

Sources

  • Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (GDPR), consolidated version — Article 4(1), (7) and (12), Article 33(1), (2), (4) and (5) and Article 34(1) and (3) — eur-lex.europa.eu.
  • Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System, consolidated text as at 9 November 2026 — Article 2(5), (7), (11e) and (11h), Article 8i(1), Article 11(1)(1), (3), (4) and (4a), Article 11(1a) and Article 11(4), Article 13 and Article 16 (in Polish) — isap.sejm.gov.pl.
  • Act of 23 January 2026 amending the Act on the National Cybersecurity System and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2026, item 252) — Article 32, Article 33(1) and (4), Article 44(1) and (3), Article 46 and Article 49 (in Polish) — isap.sejm.gov.pl.
  • Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 of 17 October 2024 — Article 1, point (e) of Article 3(1) and point (c) of Articles 7 to 13 — eur-lex.europa.eu.
  • European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 01/2021 on Examples regarding Personal Data Breach Notification, version 2.0 adopted on 14 December 2021 — Cases No. 06 and 18, paragraphs 56, 61, 62 and 129 — edpb.europa.eu.
  • European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 9/2022 on personal data breach notification under GDPR, version 2.0 adopted on 28 March 2023 — paragraphs 15, 31, 34, 44, 45, 46, 47, 77, 119 and 125 — edpb.europa.eu.
  • Personal Data Protection Office (UODO), Guide on personal data breaches, version of 20 February 2025 — sections 2.1, 2.3, 3.6, 5.2, 7.1, 8.1, 9.1 and 9.2 (in Polish) — uodo.gov.pl.

Let us agree how you respond to phishing

The order of steps after a disclosed password is best agreed with the IT department before an employee reports the first such case. Incident consultation and an orderly response process cover the assessment of a specific event and a procedure that the IT department and the data protection officer will use.

Author

Michał Rutkowski — LabLogic. He combines the legal, organisational and technological perspective in his work with the boards of medium-sized and large organisations: support for and performance of the DPO role, preparation for NIS2 and the Polish KSC Act, incident response, audits and training. Contact: M.Rutkowski@LabLogic.pl · LinkedIn

This material is general and educational in nature. It is not an individual legal opinion or a recommendation for any specific organisation. The scope of the obligations should be assessed against the situation of the organisation concerned.

Legal status: November 2026.

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