What should a NIS2 gap analysis contain?

Michał Rutkowski • for boards and senior management • published July 28, 2026 • updated October 19, 2026 • 11 min read

Short answer

A NIS2 gap analysis (also called a gap assessment) has to let the board take three decisions. What the organisation must meet, where it falls short and in what order it closes the difference. Every gap should therefore be tied to a specific obligation under the Polish Act on the National Cybersecurity System (KSC), described together with what was checked, and completed by naming the evidence with which the organisation will demonstrate that the gap is closed. The act does not require a gap analysis and does not prescribe its form, so one thing decides the value of the document. It is whether an implementation plan can be built from it and its findings shown during supervision.

Why the question comes up at all

A gap analysis is usually the first piece of work a board buys in once it has established that the organisation falls under the act. A few weeks later an extensive report arrives at a board meeting, with a numerical score and a declaration of compliance somewhere in the tens of per cent. The board cannot approve either the scope of work or the budget on that basis, and the person running the topic cannot allocate tasks, because they do not know who would carry them out.

The reason is simple. The act does not know the concept of a gap analysis and describes neither its method nor its result. That left a definitional gap which every provider fills in its own way — some measure the organisation against the catalogue of statutory obligations, others against an industry standard, others still against their own checklist. The three results look alike and mean different things.

The act does say plainly what the organisation may be asked about. The competent authority for cybersecurity may request evidence that the requirements referred to in Article 8(1) have been implemented. It may also demand the data, information and documents needed for the supervision and inspection laid down in the act (Article 53c(1)). Its supervision of essential entities is preventive in character, not only after the fact. That settles what is genuinely needed in a gap analysis. Not a score, but knowledge of what the organisation has today and what it lacks in order to answer such a request.

Then there is the calendar. Entities that met the qualification criteria on 3 April 2026 implement the obligations under Chapter 3 of the act within twelve months, and the first audit of an essential entity falls due within twenty-four months of that date. An entity that meets the criteria later has the same twelve and twenty-four months, counted from the day it meets them. According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, a former operator of essential services audited before the amendment keeps its existing audit cycle (Article 25 of the amending act and Q&A 9.5). A gap analysis is supposed to translate that calendar into tasks. If it does not, it remains a description of the state of the organisation.

What to establish before deciding

Against which baseline was the organisation measured

This is the first question worth asking once the result arrives, and the only one that invalidates everything else. A gap analysis measured against an industry standard shows the maturity of the information security management system, but it does not answer the question whether the organisation performs its statutory obligations. The two sets overlap but they are not the same.

The core of the proper baseline is set by Chapter 3 of the KSC Act, which lays down the obligations of essential or important entities. The registration obligations under Article 7b(4), Article 7c and Article 7f(3) are added to it. A useful checklist is the list of obligations in Article 8c(1) that the head of the entity answers for. Beyond the information security management system it covers registration obligations, incident handling and reporting, and security documentation. It also covers three things that are remembered least often. Designating people for contact with the entities of the national cybersecurity system, verifying the clean criminal record of persons carrying out tasks under Article 8 or Article 11, and the audit (for an important entity only when ordered by the authority). An analysis that covered only the technical measures in Article 8 describes a single provision, not the scope of the entity’s obligations.

The second dimension is even easier to miss.

Remember

The baseline is not the same for all entities covered by the act, and it is settled by the criteria for qualifying an entity.

Type of entityWhat the risk-management measures are measured against
An essential or important entity to which Article 8(1) appliesThe catalogue in Article 8(1), including the technical and organisational measures listed in point 2(a)–(n)
An important entity that is a public entity or an entity of the higher education and science system indicated in Article 8(3) that is not a research organisation, in respect of its public tasksArticle 8(1) does not apply; the simplified system in Annex 4 to the act applies instead, together with a review at least once a year and documentation of the actions taken
Digital entities listed in Article 8b(1) (including providers of cloud services, data centres and managed services) and trust service providersAdditionally the measures in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, which applies directly. According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, the Regulation covers only the activity it concerns and not the entity as a whole (Q&A 3.47)
Electricity sub-sector entities identified as having a high or critical impactThe identification is made by the minister responsible for energy (Article 52a(2)), not by the entity itself. The measures in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 — the network code on cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows — apply in addition
The banking sector and financial market infrastructureArticle 8i disapplies the provisions on the information security management system and on reporting significant incidents. What remains includes qualification and entry in the register, risk assessment together with basic cyber hygiene practices, and the liability of the head of the entity under Articles 8c–8f. According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, the exclusion concerns financial activity, and in other activity (e.g. managed services or cloud) a financial entity is subject to the act (Q&A 14.13)

If the result does not open by settling which of these arrangements apply to the organisation and in which activity, the pages that follow describe somebody else’s obligations.

What was in scope and what fell outside it

The act ties obligations to the information system used in processes that affect the provision of the service. That wording calls for a decision, and the decision should be visible in the document. It should state which services were treated as covered, which systems were assigned to them and on what basis. In a group of companies there is a second determination to make, because qualification and obligations are established separately for each company — an analysis covering “the group” leaves the individual entities without a result of their own.

What was not covered matters just as much. Excluding some systems, branches or processes is often justified but it has to be named. A result in which the boundary of the review is invisible turns from a document into guesswork at the authority’s or the auditor’s first question.

How a single gap is described

A usable description of a gap has three layers and separates them clearly. The first is the required state together with a reference to the provision it follows from. The second is the state found together with the basis for that finding. That basis covers which document was reviewed, which record or configuration was checked and who was interviewed. The third is the difference and its consequence for the organisation, that is, what will happen or what cannot be demonstrated as long as the gap stays open.

The second layer is the one most often missing. The sentence “the incident reporting procedure is incomplete”, without saying which version of the document was reviewed and what was not found in it, is an opinion rather than a finding. Six months on nobody will verify or defend it, and whoever inherits the task will start by repeating the work.

Every gap also needs an owner. Not a department, but a role that can take a decision and answer for its consequences. A gap booked to “IT” in an organisation where the business lines decide priorities will not be closed, because its owner has no mandate to change the process.

Where the order of actions comes from

Priorities are where a gap analysis differs most from a list of shortcomings. A sensible order follows from the risk to the provision of the service, the statutory deadline attached to a given obligation and the dependencies between actions. The order of articles in the act and the ease of doing the work are not criteria, even though in practice they shape plans most often.

Deadlines enter in two ways. Existing entities implement the obligations under Chapter 3 of the act by 3 April 2027, and the first audit of an essential entity falls due by 3 April 2028. According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, a former operator of essential services that carried out an audit before the amendment keeps its existing cycle (Article 25 of the amending act and Q&A 9.5). It carries out the next audit within three years of the signing of the report on the last audit. A separate deadline ran for the application for entry in the register of essential and important entities. The Minister of Digital Affairs set it in a communication for 3 October 2026 for entities that met the criteria on the day the amending act entered into force. According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, self-registration is available at all times (Q&A 2.32). An entity that meets the criteria later applies within six months of meeting them (Article 7c(1)). According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, an entity entered in the register ex officio does not apply for entry but completes the data in that entry (Q&A 2.40, 2.48). The Minister also points to S46-admin@nask.pl for an entity subject to ex officio entry that has not received notice of the entry (Q&A 2.11). Administrative fines under Article 73(1)–(4) (including paragraph 1a), Articles 73a–73c and Article 76b may be imposed for the first time after 3 April 2028 (Article 35 of the amending act). The deferral does not cover the fine of up to PLN 100 million under Article 73(5). According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, that fine is the exception (Q&A 12.1). What is deferred is the fines, not the obligations. Preventive supervision of essential entities has not been deferred at all.

Dependencies between actions settle the rest. Business continuity cannot sensibly be described before systems have been inventoried, and suppliers cannot be held to a level of security the organisation is unable to define for itself. A result that does not put this in order leaves the ordering to the board at its meeting.

What the organisation will use to show a gap is closed

The last column of a good gap analysis answers the question of how you know a gap is closed. The act divides security documentation into normative and operational, operational documentation being the records evidencing performance of the activities required by the normative documentation, including automatically generated system log entries. That division is worth carrying straight into the result of the analysis, because it settles what has to be produced.

The practical consequence is that the evidence a gap has been closed is rarely the document alone. A policy without records of its application shows intent rather than action. According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, what is required is proof that the provisions are applied, not formally correct documents (Q&A 11.6). So if the analysis identifies a gap in the area of backups, the target evidence is the procedure together with the records of restore tests and not the procedure on its own.

What a gap analysis is not

Three distinctions save the most misunderstandings.

A gap analysis is not the audit referred to in Article 15. An essential entity carries out that audit at its own expense at least once every three years. It may be performed by an accredited body, by at least two auditors meeting the statutory requirements or by a sectoral CSIRT with such auditors. The act adds a condition of independence. The audit may not be performed by a person who carries out tasks under Article 8 and Articles 9–13 in that entity or who carried them out there within the year before the audit started. A copy of the report goes to the competent authority within three working days of receipt of the report. A gap analysis need meet none of those conditions and does not discharge the audit obligation.

Nor does a gap analysis replace risk assessment. Systematic assessment of the risk of an incident and the management of that risk are a separate, continuous obligation under Article 8(1)(1). According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, an important entity that is a public entity applying Annex 4 formally has no such obligation (Q&A 3.15). A gap analysis may show that the process does not exist — it does not create it.

Finally, the result does not settle matters that remain open outside the organisation, and the most important of them concerns the thresholds for treating an incident as significant. They are set by the Council of Ministers in a regulation (Article 11(4)). However, the regulation in force dates from 31 October 2018 and implements the previous directive. It sets thresholds for six sectors in the pre-amendment arrangement, by reference to the essential service. It remains in force until new implementing provisions enter into force, and for no longer than twelve months from the entry into force of the amending act. The act excludes from the remit of the Council of Ministers the thresholds for entities for which the European Commission has set them (Article 11(4)). The Commission did so in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 for the digital entities listed in Article 8b(1) and for trust service providers. According to the Minister of Digital Affairs, the national regulation will not set those thresholds (Q&A 6.18, 6.19). An organisation outside the scope of both the 2018 regulation and Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 has no threshold to refer to today, and a gap analysis can only note the fact. The risk-management measures for entities other than digital ones and trust service providers also remain open. The European Commission may specify them in implementing acts, but it is not required to do so (Article 21(5) of Directive 2022/2555, Article 8b(2)). Until such acts exist, the catalogue in Article 8(1) remains the baseline. An honest document lists those points instead of presenting the target state as settled.

Acceptance checklist for a gap analysis

To check before accepting the document and before the budget conversation.

  • The category of the entity and the baseline that follows from it are stated, together with the legal basis.
  • The scope of the review is described. It names the services, systems and entities covered and excluded, with reasons for the exclusions.
  • The analysis covers all obligations under Chapter 3 of the act and the registration obligations, not only the technical measures.
  • Every gap carries a reference to the provision the required state follows from.
  • For every gap it is visible what the finding of fact was based on.
  • Every gap has an owner identified by a role that can take a decision.
  • Priorities are justified by risk, deadline or dependency — not by the order of the provisions.
  • For every gap the target evidence is named, distinguishing the document from the records of its application.
  • In the area of incident reporting, the thresholds by which the organisation assesses whether an incident is significant are stated — or it is noted that no threshold has been set for it today.
  • Deadlines are tied to the dates that bind this organisation and not given in general terms.
  • Unresolved points and areas requiring a board decision are listed.
  • The document contains a concise decision summary that can be presented at a meeting without reading the whole of it.

Most common mistakes

  • A score instead of a conclusion. A declaration of compliance somewhere in the tens of per cent does not say what to do first, and under supervision it means nothing.
  • Measuring against a standard instead of against the act. The result is often valuable in substance, but it does not answer the question whether the statutory obligations have been performed.
  • Leaving out obligations from outside Article 8. Registration obligations, designating contact people, documentation and incident reporting drop out of the analysis most often. The nearest deadline is that of the application for entry in the register, which already contains the contact people’s details. There must be at least two of them, or at least one in a micro or small enterprise and in an important entity that is a public entity (Article 9(1)–(3)).
  • Treating a gap analysis as the Article 15 audit. An essential entity that considers the matter closed discovers the error only when the audit falls due.
  • Gaps without an owner. The document then describes the state of the organisation but triggers no action.
  • Postponing the work because fines have been deferred. The deadlines for performing the obligations run independently of the date from which fines may be imposed.

Conclusions and next steps

The value of a gap analysis is measured by how many decisions can be taken on its basis without additional work. A document in which every gap has a legal basis, an established finding of fact, an owner and target evidence turns into an implementation plan without being rewritten. A document with a score requires that work to be done all over again, usually in-house and without a budget.

The sequence after accepting the result is short. First the board settles what the analysis could not settle. These are the accepted level of risk, the split of work between the in-house team and the provider, and the resources. Then the gaps have to be grouped into tasks with deadlines tied to 3 April 2027, with those that condition the others set apart — the inventory of systems, the naming of process owners and the incident escalation path. Finally the review rhythm is set, because a gap analysis describes the state on the day of the review and the organisation keeps changing.

If, after reading the result, you cannot answer the question of what the organisation would show the authority in response to a request for evidence that the requirements have been implemented, the analysis needs completing before implementation starts.

Sources

  • Act of July 5, 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System, consolidated text (as at August 18, 2026) — ISAP, Chancellery of the Sejm: isap.sejm.gov.pl (in Polish)
  • Act of January 23, 2026 amending the Act on the National Cybersecurity System and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2026, item 252) — transitional provisions, Journal of Laws: dziennikustaw.gov.pl (in Polish)
  • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of October 31, 2018 on the thresholds for treating an incident as significant (Journal of Laws 2018, item 2180) — ISAP: isap.sejm.gov.pl (in Polish)
  • Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 14, 2022 (NIS 2 Directive) — Article 21(5) — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
  • Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 of October 17, 2024 — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
  • Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 of March 11, 2024 establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows — EUR-Lex: eur-lex.europa.eu
  • Communication of the Minister of Digital Affairs of April 8, 2026 on the schedule for filing applications for entry in the register of essential and important entities and for the start of use of the ICT system by essential or important entities (Official Journal of the Minister of Digital Affairs, item 7) — Ministry of Digital Affairs: gov.pl (in Polish)
  • Minister of Digital Affairs, National cybersecurity system — questions and answers on the amendment of the KSC Act, update of October 2026 — Q&A 2.11, 2.32, 2.40, 2.48, 3.15, 3.47, 6.18, 6.19, 9.5, 11.6, 12.1, 14.13 — Ministry of Digital Affairs: cyber.gov.pl (in Polish)

Let us see what the analysis says about your organisation

If you already have the document but it is unclear what follows from it for the scope of work and the budget, it is worth going through it for legal bases, owners and evidence. Support with NIS2 and KSC readiness covers establishing the scope of obligations, the gap analysis and a plan of actions that can be sustained and demonstrated during an audit.

Author

Michał Rutkowski — LabLogic. He combines the legal, organisational and technological perspective in his work with the boards of medium-sized and large organisations: support for and performance of the DPO role, preparation for NIS2 and the Polish KSC Act, incident response, audits and training. Contact: M.Rutkowski@LabLogic.pl · LinkedIn

This material is general and educational in nature. It is not an individual legal opinion or a recommendation for any specific organisation. The scope of the obligations should be assessed against the situation of the organisation concerned.

Legal status: November 2026.

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